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THE DELINEATION OF ACCOUNTANTS'
LEGAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES:
BILY AND BEYOND
BONITA A. DALY*
JOHN M. GIBSON**
INTODUCTION
In August 1992, in a rare display of unity designed to influ-
ence public opinion,' the heads of the six largest ("Big Six") U.S.
firms of certified public accountants ("CPAs") issued a position
statement that decries the current state of accountants' legal lia-
bility.2 In addition, the Big Six, the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants ("AICPA"), and several statewide CPA so-
cieties are lobbying for changes in state and federal laws.' Among
the proposals suggested are (1) enacting federal laws that regulate
securities transactions to replace joint and several liability with
proportionate liability, (2) requiring plaintiffs to pay the defen-
dant's legal fees in meritless suits, and (3) prohibiting third par-
* Assistant Professor, University of Oklahoma, School of Accounting.
** Wilsey Meyer and Company, P.C.
1 Junda Woo, Big Six Accounting Firms Join Forces for Legal Change, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 1, 1992, at B8.
2 J. Michael Cook et al., The Liability Crisis in the United States: Impact on the
Accounting Profession, J. AcoT., Nov. 1992, at 19 [hereinafter Liability Crisis]. In
addition to Mr. Cook, the chairman and chief executive officer of Deloitte & Touche,
the statement was signed by Eugene M. Freedman, chairman, Coopers & Lybrand;
Ray J. Groves, chairman, Ernst & Young; Jon C. Madonna, chairman and chief execu-
tive, KPMG Peat Marwick- Shaun F. O'Malley, chairman and senior partner, Price
Waterhouse; and Lawrence A. Weinbach, managing partner and chief executive, Ar-
thur Andersen & Co. Id.
3 See Gary M. Bolinger et al., Legislating Liability Reform, J. AccT., July 1993, at
52.
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ties, such as stock brokers, from receiving payments for referring
plaintiffs to attorneys.4 Efforts are also being made to remove leg-
islative, regulatory, and professional restrictions that prohibit
CPA firms from operating as limited liability organizations.'
One of the main goals of those who seek a legislative remedy
to the "liability crisis" is replacing joint and several liability with
proportionate liability as the basis for assessing damages. The ef-
ficacy of this approach is questionable. Assuming proportionate
liability replaced joint and several liability as the basis for assess-
ing damages, accountants would continue to confront the threat of
litigation whenever third parties incurred financial losses. Plain-
tiffs are likely to argue that their reliance on accounting informa-
tion, such as an unqualified audit opinion, formed the principal
basis that motivated the plaintiffs to make their investments or
loans. Rather than focusing on liability, one should first address
the standing of third parties to bring suits alleging auditor negli-
gence. In the analysis that follows, this Article argues that the
1992 California Supreme Court's decision in Bily v. Arthur Young
& Co. 6 provides a standard for determining auditors' liability to
third parties that is fair to both plaintiffs and defendants. The
Bily court held that the liability of accountants for general negli-
gence in conducting an audit of its client's financial statements is
confined to the client.7 Only when accountants make negligent
misrepresentations to specifically intended recipients of their
services does the potential for liability to third parties for negli-
gence arise.8 Bily is important because it rejects the expansive
interpretation of auditors' liability for negligence to third parties
under the foreseeability standard9 the court had previously
embraced.10
4 See Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 23; AICPA Chairman Testifies Before Sen-
ate Subcommittee, J. Accr., Sept. 1993, at 19; Litigation Reform Bills Introduced:
Drive for Passage Builds, J. AccT., Nov. 1992, at 25 (discussing relevant provisions of
S. 3181 and H.R. 5828, sponsored by Senators Domenici and Sanford and Representa-
tives Tauzin, Lent, Hall, and Ritter).
5 See Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 23.
6 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
7 Id. at 767.
8 Id.
9 Under the foreseeability standard, discussed in detail in the analysis of common
law precedents, infra note 84 and accompanying text, auditors' liability for negligence
extends to third parties whom the auditor could reasonably foresee as recipients of
the audited financial statements.
10 Bily, 834 P.2d at 774; see International Mortgage Corp. v. John P. Butler Ac-
countancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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In the absence of restrictions on the standing of third parties
to sue auditors for negligence, auditors bear many of the risks of
business failure. Part I of this Article provides support for this
assertion and discusses the impact risk shifting has on the prac-
tice of accounting and the availability of investment capital. We
also present the profession's position on the limitations of auditing
procedures for evaluating management ability and honesty and
for predicting business success or failure. Next, we trace the
course of legal precedents in defining accountants' liabilities to
third parties. Based on judicial interpretation of section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and common-law cases, we con-
clude that Bily appropriately confines auditor liability for negli-
gence to clients and specifically intended third parties. Finally,
we argue that developing improved procedures to meet account-
ants' obligations to third parties, as defined by Bily, will serve
both the accounting profession and the public. We discuss propos-
als offered by the Public Oversight Board ("POB") of the AICPA11
and endorsed by the AICPA board of directors,1 2 which have the
potential for improving the audit process and better defining the
assurances that audited financial reports provide.
11 See PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, SEC PRACTICE SECTION, IN THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST: ISSUES CONFRONTING THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION (1993) [hereinafter PUBLIC
INTEREST]. The Public Oversight Board (POB") is an independent board that the
AICPA created in 1977 to oversee and report on the AICPA Peer Review Program. See
The Mandatory SECPS Membership Vote, J. ACCT., Aug. 1989, at 42. As of 1990, the
AICPA has required that firms auditing SEC clients be members of the SEC Practice
Section and participate in triennial reviews by the Peer Review Committee ("PRC").
PUBLIC INTEREST, supra at 16. The Quality Control Inquiry Committee ("QCIC") ex-
amines the quality controls of firms against whom allegations of audit failure have
been made. Id. If deficiencies are found, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice
Section can impose sanctions such as requiring that the firm take corrective measures
and provide additional continuing professional education for firm members. Id. at 79.
It can accelerate or require special peer reviews, issue admonishments, censures or
reprimands, suspend the firm's membership in the SEC Practice Section, and expel
the firm from membership in the AICPA.
The members of the POB select successive members, hire and compensate its
staff, set the compensation of the members, and choose the chairman. The present
members are A. A. Sommer, Jr., chairman, Robert I. Mautz, vice chairman, Melvin R.
Laird, Paul W. McCracken, and Robert F. Froehlke.
12 See Board of Directors of the American Institute of CPAs, Meeting the Finan-
cial Reporting Needs of the Future: A Public Commitment from the Public Accounting
Profession, J. ACCT., Aug. 1993, at 17.
1994]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:609
I. THE IMPACT OF LITIGATION ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
According to the Big Six and several commentators, unprece-
dented numbers of investors and creditors who experience eco-
nomic losses are turning to the courts to recover their funds.1 3 In
addition, as guarantor of the obligations of savings and loan insti-
tutions ("S&Ls"), the federal government is suing the former audi-
tors of S&Ls that are now defunct.14 By the time guarantors,
creditors, and investors seek legal redress for their losses, those
who received the funds, either failed S&Ls or other business enti-
ties and their officers and directors, are frequently bankrupt or
have modest assets.' 5 Although independent CPAs, unlike the
borrower or recipient of invested funds, seldom play a direct role
in business failures, the accounting firms are solvent and are per-
ceived as "deep pockets" from which to recoup losses. 16 In the past
two years, litigation-related expenditures by the Big Six increased
by fifty percent and are now equal to eleven percent of U.S. audit-
ing and accounting revenues.' 7 The Big Six claim that the poten-
13 See, e.g., Nancy Chaffee, The Role and Responsibility of Accountants in Today's
Society, 13 J. CoRp. L. 863 (1988); James L. Craig & Robert Mednick, The War on
Accountant's Legal Liability, CPA J., Mar. 1990, at 20-25; Dean Foust, They're Bean
Counters, Not Gumshoes, Bus. Wi., Sept. 14, 1992, at 92; Robert Mednick, Account-
ants' Liability: Coping with the Stampede to the Courtroom, J. AcCT., Sept. 1987, at
119; Lawrence A. Weinbach, Legal Crisis Paralyzes U.S. Innovation, AcCT. TODAY,
May 11, 1992, at 35-37.
14 See, e.g., Lee Berton, Big Accounting Firms Face Ban in S&L Bailouts, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 14, 1990, at A3 (describing how suits by government have led to ban by
RTC from getting thrift reorganization work); Christi Harlan & Paul M. Barrett,
FDIC Sues Dallas-Area Lawyers in Vernon S&L Failure, WAL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1990,
at B8 (discussing lawsuit based on alleged misrepresentations); John W. Hill &
Michael B. Metzger, Auditor Liability and the S&L Crisis: Shaping the Future of the
Profession?, 11 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 263, 263-64 (1992) (recognizing that lawsuits
are being commenced against public accounting firms over audits of S&Ls); Sherry R.
Sontag, Soured Deals Snag More Professionals, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 1 (report-
ing FDIC efforts to recapture losses from accountants).
15 PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 5.
16 See Philip Lochner, Jr., Black Days for Accounting Firms, WAIL ST. J., May 22,
1992, at A10; see also John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of In-
strumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv., 1929, 1932-33 (1988) (arguing that since
client is often insolvent injured party will sue accountant).
17 Stephen H. Miller, AICPA Announces Major Initiative to Strengthen Financial
Reporting and Further Tort Reform Prospects, J. Accr., Aug. 1993, at 15-16 (citing J.
Michael Cook, chairman and chief executive officer of Deloitte & Touche); see also
Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 20. Including the cost of legal services, settlements,
judgments, and liability insurance premiums, less insurance reimbursements, litiga-
tion-related costs incurred by the Big Six in 1991 were $477 million, 9% of audit and
accounting revenues in the United States. Id. In 1990, the figure was $404 million,
7.7% of revenues. Id.
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tial for excessive damage assessments often makes it economical
to settle with plaintiffs, rather than defend themselves in jury tri-
als."' In November 1992, for example, Ernst and Young agreed to
a $400 million settlement with federal bank and thrift regulators
to satisfy all current and potential claims relating to Ernst and
Young's audits of depository institutions that failed during the
past ten years.19 Today in the United States, there are an esti-
mated $30 billion in damage claims outstanding against all pro-
fessional CPAs.2 °
Litigation is creating a financial burden that more and more
CPAs are either unable or unwilling to bear. In 1990, Laventhol
& Horwath, formerly the seventh largest CPA firm in the United
States, declared bankruptcy. The firm faced liability claims total-
ling $2 billion and the cost of defending those claims in court. The
former partners agreed to pay $48 million as part of the liquida-
tion of the firm in order to avoid personal bankruptcy.2 1 In 1992,
Pannell Kerr Forster closed or sold approximately ninety percent
of its offices, and its principals formed individual professional cor-
porations. Legal liabilities under the partnership mode of organi-
zation contributed to the dissolution of the firm. 2
Insurers consider accountants' liability insurance to be among
the more risky lines of business, and in recent years, they have
abandoned or sharply curtailed the coverage they offer, sometimes
by as much as 25%.23 Although insurers reduced the protection
18 See Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 20 (noting possibility of jury awarding
twenty times settlement amount); Auditor's S&L Tab is $82 Million, Bus. INs., Aug.
9, 1993, at 22. Arthur Andersen & Co. agreed to pay the Resolution Trust Corp. $82
million to settle all charges that negligent audits contributed to the collapse of several
thrifts, the largest of which was the 1989 failure of Houston-based Benjamin Franklin
Savings Association. Id.; Paul Geoghan, Punitive Damages: A Storm over the Account-
ing Profession, J. AccT., July 1992, at 46. Although the parties ultimately settled for
an undisclosed amount, a Texas jury assessed punitive damages in the amount of
$200 million against Coopers & Lybrand for allegedly conducting faulty audits and
approving false financial statements. Id. at 47.
19 See Hard-Hit Accountants Hope to Limit Liability, NAe'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at
5.
20 Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 20.
21 Id. at 21; see L&H: The Grim Reality, PuB. AccT. REp., May 31, 1992, at 4.
22 Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 21; see also Kathy Seal, PKF Partners Push
Ahead, HOTEL & MOTEL MGNIr., Jan. 13, 1992, at 13 (reporting new consulting group
forming in attempt to "abandon a sinking ship").
23 See Dan Goldwasser, Policy Considerations in Accountants' Liability to Third
Parties for Negligence, 3 J. AccT., AuDrriNG & FiN. 217, 226 (1988). Underwriting
practice and insurance regulations typically require that the amount of insurance
premiums accepted be limited to a multiple of the insurer's capital. The ratio is be-
1994]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
provided for professional liability during the period from 1985 to
the present, they increased policy premiums by large amounts. In
1985, for example, the largest accounting firms had their coverage
cut from approximately $200 million to $100 million.24 A 1992
AICPA survey of firms other than the Big Six indicates that in
1991, public accounting firms paid liability insurance premiums
that were three hundred percent higher than the premiums paid
in 1985. During this same period, deductibles increased from a
median $42,000 to $240,000.25 The AICPA survey also indicates
that forty percent of firms, excluding the six largest, decided
against carrying professional liability insurance as a result of the
high cost of premiums. 26 For the six largest firms, premium in-
creases were higher than for other CPA firms, and in 1992 the
deductibles exceeded $25 million for the first loss.2 7
To reduce the risk of exposure to litigation, accounting firms
have restricted their auditing practices. The Big Six have begun
avoiding clients in high-risk categories such as banking, insur-
ance, real estate, high technology, and mid-size firms in general.28
In California, thirty-two percent of small and medium-size ac-
counting firms are discontinuing audits in high-risk sectors.29 A
survey conducted by insurance broker Johnson & Higgins found
that fifty-six percent of mid-sized CPA firms will not do business
with clients in high-risk industries.30 As Richard C. Breeden, for-
mer chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") ac-
tween 2 1/2 and 5 to 1, with the higher ratios allowed for the lower risk lines, e.g., fire
and marine, and the lower ratios for the higher risk categories, e.g., professional lia-
bility. Id. at 226 n.30. From 1985 to 1987, when confronted with market losses on
investments and high insurance claims, insurers faced capital reserves that were at
the limit for the amount of premiums collected. In order to correct this situation in-
surers reduced the number and value of policies in high risk categories. Id.
24 Id. at 226.
25 See Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 20.
26 Id. at 21 (chosing not to insure is known as "going bare").
27 Id.
28 Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 22; see also Hill & Metzger, supra note 14, at
329-31.
29 Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 22.
30 Id.; see Michael Bradford, E&O Insurance for Accountants, Costly, Plentiful,
Bus. INs., Oct. 8, 1990, at 82. The Johnson & Higgins survey results are based on 500
telephone interviews of CPAs at mid-sized firms (over 50 accountants and not among
Big Six) across the nation; see also Lee Berton, Legal-Liability Awards are Frighten-
ing Smaller CPA Firms Away From Audits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1992, at B1 (report-
ing many firms turning down auditing work); Mariann Caprino, Lawsuit-Wary CPAs
Screening Potential Clients to Avoid Risk, CH. ThIB., Nov. 19, 1990, at 5 (stating that
accountants are now more selective in choosing clients).
[Vol. 68:609
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knowledged, this disturbing trend affects both accounting practi-
tioners and the U.S. economy as a whole.3 ' Small and medium-
sized businesses are responsible for most employment growth and
often need the services of CPAs to gain access to potential credi-
tors. High-technology businesses contribute to U.S. competitive-
ness in world markets, but they are also high risk. When their
share prices decline, these businesses and their CPAs often be-
come defendants in lawsuits initiated by stockholders. This re-
sults in higher costs of funds, fewer initial public offerings
("IPOs"), and slower growth in an important sector of the
economy.3
2
Expectations that an unqualified audit opinion guarantees a
fail-safe investment are unrealistic.3 3 CPAs issue opinions on fi-
nancial statements which are the product and responsibility of
company management.3 4 CPAs are hired by management to ex-
amine the company's books and records to determine whether
management's representations fairly present the results of opera-
tions and the financial position of the company in accordance with
31 Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 22 ("At some point, these increasing litigation
costs will increase the cost of audit services and tend to reduce access to our national
securities markets.") (quoting letter from SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden to Rep.
John D. Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives (May 5, 1992)).
32 See S. P. Kothari et al., Auditor Liability and Information Disclosure, 3 J.
AccT., AuDrriNG & FIN. 307, 328-31 (1988) (discussing empirical studies that provide
support for these conclusions). The authors' own time-series analysis, however, did
not support the hypothesized association between increased auditor liability and
fewer IPOs. Id.
33 See SEC v. Arthur Young, 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979). The court rejected
the SEC's argument that audited financial statements should reveal the financial
risks that investors presently bear or might bear in the future if they invested in the
audited company. Id. at 787-88. In rejecting the SEC position, the court noted that
such a requirement "would go far toward making the accountant both an insurer of
his client's honesty and an enforcement arm of the SEC." Id. at 788; see also George
H. Sorter et al., Accountant's Legal Liability: A Determinant of the Accounting Model,
3 J. AccT., AuDrriNG & FiN. 233, 233-44 (1988) (proposing "tiered" liability system
that distinguishes between risks arising from accountants' failure to exercise due care
(which accountants should bear) and risks inherent in financial marketplace (which
investors and management should bear)). The authors argue that the existing legal
liability system provides incentives for accountants and management to withhold in-
formation, such as sales projections, that could reduce financial risk. Id. Under the
current legal system, such nomnandatory disclosures would inevitably increase litiga-
tion when projections, which are necessarily based on estimates, fail to be realized.
34 CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITNG STANDARDS, § 110.02 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1993) [hereinafter Auditing Standards are designated
with "AU," followed by a section number and page number, e.g. AU § 110.02, at 19].
1994]
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generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP").35 Limitations
inherent in an audit are numerous. First, the examination is
based on selective testing of the data because the cost and time
required to examine all data outweigh the benefits. 6 Second,
many items reported in financial statements are estimates of
amounts that depend on the outcome of future events, such as the
net realizable value of inventory or accounts receivable. 7 Third,
management can override internal controls, fail to record transac-
tions that the auditor may be unable to detect, or collude with
others to conceal misstatements or irregularities. 38 And fourth,
subjective judgments of materiality are critical to the auditor's
evaluation of whether financial statements follow GAAP.3 9 An au-
dit report is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that can be
measured against uniform standards of indisputable accuracy.40
Given the uncertainties inherent in the auditing process, it is un-
reasonable to expect that a CPA's unqualified opinion on a com-
pany's financial statements is a warranty against fraud or mis-
management on the part of the company's management.
35 Id. § 411.05, at 310. Generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") in-
clude accounting principles and procedures, customs, expert judgment, formal ac-
counting standards, and materials written by accountants.
36 Id. § 350.07, at 279.
37 Id. § 342.01, at 267.
38 Id. § 316.03, at 75. Section 316.07 of the ALCPA Codification of Statements on
Auditing Standards Comments:
Because of the characteristics of irregularities, particularly those involving
forgery and collusion, a properly designed and executed audit may not detect
a material irregularity. For example, generally accepted auditing standards
do not require that an auditor authenticate documents, nor is an auditor
trained to do so. Also, audit procedures that are effective for detecting a
misstatement that is unintentional may be ineffective for a misstatement
that is intentional and is concealed through collusion between client person-
nel and third parties or among management or employees of the client.
§ 316.07, at 16.
39 Materiality is the auditor's estimation of the magnitude of an omission or mis-
statement of accounting information that, in the light of surrounding circumstances,
would make it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the infor-
mation would have been changed or influenced. QuALrrATIV CHARAnmTusTIcS OF Ac-
COUNTING INFORMATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, 68-71
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1992/93). Estimations of materiality are the basis for
determining the type and amount of evidence required to corroborate managemeniVs
financial statement representations. AU § 326.11, at 154; AU § 350.21, at 282.
40 Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992) ("An auditor is a
watchdog, not a bloodhound."). Because management is responsible for and directly
controls the preparation of the financial statement to be used in an audit, an auditor
cannot, in the limited time available, become an expert in the client's business. There-
fore, indisputable accuracy cannot be attained. Id.
616 [Vol. 68:609
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In the following analysis, this Article reviews the common-
law basis for accountants' liability to third parties for professional
negligence. 4 ' According to the Big Six, the greatest liability expo-
sure resides in states in which cases are brought under common
law theories or specific state laws.42 Common-law precedent,
therefore, is extremely important in defining accountants'
liability.
II. COMMON LAW AND AccouNTANTs' LEGAL LiAmrurms TO
THIRD PARTIES FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
In providing professional services, accountants may incur
legal liabilities for negligence, fraud, and the violation of federal
and state statutes. Liabilities arising under federal statutes in
connection with the registration or sale of publicly traded securi-
ties are beyond the scope of this Article.43 Similarly, other federal
and state statutory provisions are not encompassed in this
analysis.4
To find a defendant liable for fraud, a plaintiff must show that
(1) the defendant made a false representation of material fact; (2)
the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act; (3) the de-
fendant made such representation with knowledge that it was
41 This Article is limited to the typical case in which an auditor's liability for neg-
ligence to third parties is alleged. In such a case, plaintiffs assert that had the audi-
tor not been negligent in the conduct of the audit, material misstatements or omis-
sions in the audited financial statements or other financial information would have
been detected. Typically, financial statements are prepared by the auditor's client,
and the auditor attests to their material accuracy. In the usual case, the client (the
corporation or other business entity, officers or directors, or employees) is alleged to
have acted negligently or fraudulently in providing financial information. It is the
auditor's negligence, however, rather than his or her knowledge of the misstatement
(scienter), which is the subject of the litigation.
42 See Liability Crisis, supra note 2, at 23. Of the total cases pending against the
Big Six in 1991, only 30% claimed Rule 10b-5 violations, which are violations of fed-
eral securities laws. Id. Of that 30%, less than 10% were exclusively Rule 10b-5
claims. Id.
43 Accounting and auditing services provided by CPAs in connection with the sale
of securities are subject to regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. See generally Kevin Roddy, Professionals'Liability for Vio-
lations of the Federal Securities Law, RICO, and State Law Claims, in CAuIFoRNIA
MCLE MARATHON 1994: SEcuxrrms LAw UPDATE, at 271 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 858, 1994).
44 See id. Since 1985, legal actions against accountants have been brought under
the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 ("RICO"), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Id.; see also Hill & Metzger, supra note 14, at 267 n.29.
Auditors are defendants in numerous suits brought by the FDIC in connection with
the failures of savings and loan institutions. Id.
1994]
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false or without knowledge of its truth or falsity, but that the
plaintiff reasonably believed it was true; and (4) the plaintiff re-
lied on the representation to his detriment.4 5 The knowledge re-
quirement is satisfied if the plaintiff can show that the representa-
tions were made with reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity.46 Moreover, accountants may be held liable not only to
their clients but also to reasonably foreseeable third persons for
intentional fraud in the preparation and dissemination of an audit
report.47
In contrast to the case law involving fraud, judicial decisions
vary greatly when the issue is accountant liability to third parties
for negligence or negligent misrepresentation. The following anal-
ysis discusses the application of the privity requirement, the
foreseeability standard,48 and section 552 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.
A. Privity Standard
Traditionally, professional liability arose pursuant to the doc-
trine of privity, which was derived from a classic enumeration of
the rationale in Winterbottom v. Wright.49 According to Winterbot-
45 See Michael A. Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third
Parties, 52 NOTRn DAmE L. REV. 838, 845-48 (1977) (providing analysis of account-
ants' liability for fraud).
46 See, e.g., State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that
needless and reckless disregard of consequences may take place of deliberate inten-
tion); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (concluding
that reckless disregard of consequences is sufficient to hold accountants liable for
malpractice).
47 See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
48 See Jordan H. Liebman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third Par-
ties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 AM.
Bus. L.J., 347, 438-39 (1992). In their comprehensive review of accountants' legal
liabilities, Liebman and Kelly advocate the foreseeability standard coupled with an
apportionment of liability for monetary damages based on the degree of culpability of
an individual defendant. Id.; see also Hill & Metzger, supra note 14. Hill and Metz-
ger argue that legal precedents that deny the use of comparative negligence defenses
in auditing cases may nullify any possible benefits from the adoption of proportionate
liability. Id. at 267-75. In support of their position, the authors cite National Sur.
Corp. v. Lybrand, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 562-63 (App. Div. 1939) (stating that client's con-
tributory fault does not enable auditors to avoid liability for plaintiffs' entire loss);
Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300, 306-07 (Neb. 1984) (decid-
ing under comparative fault principles that National Surety applied); and Fullmer v.
Wohfeiler & Beck, 905 F.2d 1394, 1397-99 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that
National Surety rule be changed in light of availability of comparative fault). Id. at
268 n.30, 274 n.71.
49 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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tom, only parties to the contract have enforceable rights under
that contract. In Savings Bank v. Ward,5 0 the Supreme Court cre-
ated two exceptions to the privity requirement: fraud and acts
that are "imminently dangerous" to the lives of others."1
In 1916, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.5 2 eliminated the
privity defense in product liability cases involving third parties.
MacPherson sued when he was injured as a result of the collapse
of a defectively manufactured wheel on his Buick automobile.53
Buick Motor Co. claimed lack of privity, but the court rejected the
defense and adopted a tort-based liability concept.5 4 The duty
stemming from tort-based negligence is a general duty owed to all
those who may use one's products or services.5 5 This differs from
the duty arising from a contract-specific obligation, which is owed
only to those with whom one has contracted. Although tort-based
liability for negligence that results in physical injury was recog-
nized in MacPherson, the courts have been reluctant to extend
this liability to cases in which damages were entirely economic in
nature.
5 6
In Glanzer v. Shepard,7 Judge Cardozo tacitly rejected the
privity defense against charges of negligence brought by certain
narrowly defined third parties5 s The plaintiff in Glanzer sought
monetary damages for an overpayment that arose out of a faulty
weight certification by the defendant, a public weigher.5 9 The
court held that privity was not required because the third-party
reliance on the certificate was the "end and aim" of the transac-
tion.60 For liability to third parties to arise under Glanzer, how-
50 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
51 Id. at 205-06.
52 Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
53 Id. at 1051.
54 Id. at 1053.
55 See RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 707-08 (5th ed. 1984); see
also Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson, 843 P.2d 890, 908-09 (Or. 1992)
('Negligence liability ... is based on a paradigm which is fundamentally different
than that on which contract liability is predicated.... [Tihe scope of liability is...
determined by the reasonably foreseeable consequences of one's actions and by consid-
erations of policy that at times limit the scope of the liability.").
56 Susan L. Martin, If Privity is Dead, Let's Resurrect It: Liability of Professionals
to Third Parties for Economic Injury Caused by Negligent Misrepresentation, 28 Am.
Bus. L.J. 649, 652 (1991).
57 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
58 Id. at 276.
59 Id. at 275.
60 Id.
1994] 619
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ever, the contracting party must know that his or her services are
intended for the use of the third parties.61 In addition, the con-
tracting parties control the extent of the duty and thus, the extent
to which they are liable to third parties for their losses.
In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,62 Judge Cardozo further de-
fined the requirements under which liability to third parties may
arise. The plaintiff in Ultramares, extended credit to Fred Stern
& Company, Inc. ("Stern"), Touche's audit client, in reliance on a
certified balance sheet that portrayed a net worth in excess of $1
million.63 Stern was, in fact, insolvent. The court held that liabil-
ity for negligence did not extend to parties who did not share priv-
ity of contract. Judge Cardozo distinguished Ultramares and
Glanzer by analyzing the "end and aim of the transaction."64 The
court held that the accountant's work product was intended pri-
marily for the use of the client and only incidentally for the third
party.65
Judge Cardozo rationalized this limitation of an accountant's
liability for negligence by stating, "[ilf liability for negligence ex-
ists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose ac-
countants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class."66 Judge Cardozo con-
cluded that, because of the tremendous potential for liability,
Touche could not be held liable to a third party for mere negli-
gence.67 According to Ultramares, liability for general negligence
extends to contracting parties or third parties in a relationship
with the auditor that is "akin to privity."68
Subsequent decisions in numerous jurisdictions have cited
Ultramares and Judge Cardozo's reasoning therein as the basis
for restricting liability for general negligence to clients and a nar-
row class of third parties who were known or foreseen by the ac-
countant, reasoning that such third parties have the equivalent of
61 Id. at 276.
62 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
63 Id. at 442.
64 Id. at 445.
65 Id. at 446.
66 Id. at 444.
67 Ultramares 174 N.E. at 447-48.
68 Id. at 441.
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privity.69 In Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,70 the New
York Court of Appeals reaffirmed Ultramares as follows:
Before accountants may be held liable for negligence to noncon-
tractual parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate finan-
cial reports, certain prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the ac-
countant must have been aware that the financial reports were
to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the further-
ance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and
(3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the ac-
countants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces
the accountants' understanding of that party or parties'
reliance.7 1
When the above conditions are met, general negligence ap-
plies if, in fulfilling a contract for professional services, an ac-
countant fails to exercise that degree of skill and competence rea-
sonably expected of persons in his profession. 72 An accountant
has a duty to act honestly, in good faith, and with reasonable care
in the discharge of his professional obligations.73 An accountant
or auditor discharges his professional obligations with reasonable
care by complying with industry standards, i.e., GAAP, and gener-
ally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS").7 ' Compliance with
GAAP and GAAS, however, will not immunize an accountant from
liability for fraud when he consciously chooses not to disclose a
known, material fact.75
The duty to disclose known, material facts extends beyond the
date that the CPA issues an opinion on a client's financial state-
ments. In Fischer v. Kletz, 76 subsequent to issuing an unqualified
69 See, e.g. Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So.2d 390 (Ala. 1989);
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989); Citizens
Natl Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989); White v. Guarente, 372
N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977).
70 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
71 Id. at 118.
72 Ban'croft v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 203 F. Supp. 49, 52 (W.D. La.), affid,
309 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1962).
73 SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979).
74 Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v. Swartz, 455 F.2d 847, 852 (4th Cir.
1972); see supra note 35. Generally accepted audit standards ("GAAS") are general
standards, standards of field work, and standards of reporting with which all mem-
bers of the AICPA must comply. See AU § 150.02, at 21; AU § 161.01, at 23.
75 Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d at 788-89; see also United States v. Simon, 425
F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part,
540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
76 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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audit opinion, Peat, Marwick & Mitchell discovered misstate-
ments in its client's prior period financial statements. The finan-
cial statements and derivatives of the financial statements were
later used to solicit investments. The court held that accountants
have a continuing duty to divulge information discovered after the
conclusion of the audit.77 Quoting from an SEC case, the court
noted that "[t]he public accountant must report fairly on the facts
as he finds them whether favorable or unfavorable to his client.
His duty is to safeguard the public interest, not that of his
client."78
Strict interpretation of the privity requirement was followed
in two recent cases in which summary judgment was upheld in
favor of the accountants. In Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc.
v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 79 the vice president of Security Pa-
cific Business Credit ("SPBC") made a single telephone call to an
audit partner at Main Hurdman, Peat's predecessor firm, indicat-
ing that SPBC would be relying on an audit of the financial state-
ments of Top Brass Enterprises, Inc. to extend a line of credit to be
secured by Top Brass's accounts receivable.8 0 The New York
Court of Appeals reasserted the test established in Credit Alliance
and concluded that Peat's work was only incidentally for the use of
SPBC and did not impose liability to SPBC for negligence."' A
mere telephone call did not convert the relationship between
SPBC and Peat's predecessor accounting firm into a relationship
"sufficiently approaching privity."8 2
In Venturtech II v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells,83 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
dismissed charges brought by venture capital investors alleging
they relied on Deloitte's audits of Learning Resources, Inc. The
court ruled that the investors could not maintain an action for
negligence against Deloitte because they were never designated as
third party beneficiaries, they never received annual audit reports
77 Id. at 188 ("The common law has long required that a person who has made a
representation must correct that representation if it becomes false and if he knows
people are relying on it.").
78 Id. at 180 (quoting In re Touche, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957)).
79 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1991).
80 Id. at 1082-83.
81 Id. at 1085.
82 Id.
83 790 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd sub nom., Heritage Capital Corp. v.
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 993 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1609
(1994).
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directly from Deloitte and, with the exception of the 1982 audit,
there was no evidence Deloitte knew the financial statements
would be distributed to or used by the investors.8 '
B. Foreseeability
In a 1983 law review article, Howard B. Wiener, an associate
justice of the California Court of Appeal, advocated the rejection of
the rule in Ultramares.8 5 He argued that accountant liability
based on foreseeable injury would serve the dual functions of com-
pensation for injury and deterrence of negligent conduct.8 6 The
foreseeability basis for defining third-party claimants to whom an
auditor is liable was applied in Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.8 7 In Ad-
ler the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a claim for negligent
misrepresentation asserted by stock purchasers. The court con-
cluded that it found no reason to distinguish accountants from
other suppliers of products or services to the public and no reason
to deny recovery to third-party users of financial statements for
economic loss resulting from negligent misrepresentation.8 8 From
a public policy standpoint, the court emphasized the potential de-
terrent effect of a liability-imposing rule on the conduct and cost of
audits when it stated:
The imposition of a duty to foreseeable users may cause account-
ing firms to engage in more thorough reviews. This might entail
setting up stricter standards and applying closer supervision,
which should tend to reduce the number of instances in which
liability would ensue. Much of the additional cost incurred either
because of more thorough auditing review or increased insurance
premiums would be borne by the business entity and its stock-
holders or its customers.8 9
To prevail, plaintiffs must rely on the audited statements pur-
suant to the business purposes for which the statements were pro-
vided.90 Moreover, the plaintiffs must be reasonably foreseeable
recipients of the audited company's statements pursuant to its
84 Id. at 583.
85 Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant
for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 233, 236 (1983).
86 Id. at 260.
87 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1987).
88 Id. at 143-47.
89 Id. at 152. But see supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting insurance in-
dustry's reluctance to provide coverage for types of policies to which Rosenblum court
refers).
90 Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 153.
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proper business purposes.91 The court's rule precludes auditor lia-
bility to an institutional investor, portfolio manager, or prospec-
tive stock purchaser who does not obtain the statements directly
from the audited company.92 Those, however, who obtain audited
statements from stockbrokers, friends, or otherwise acquire them
are no less foreseeable users.93 As noted in the Bily decision, the
Rosenblum approach suggests a concern for the potentially unlim-
ited liability of auditors to foreseeable users, but offers no expla-
nation for limiting that liability on the basis of the company's dis-
tribution of the financial statements, a factor over which the
auditor has no control. 94
In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,95 a Wiscon-
sin bank sued the accounting firm of Timm, Schmidt & Co. to re-
cover losses it sustained when it allegedly made loans in reliance
on Clintonville Fire Apparatus' 1973-1976 audited financial re-
ports that contained material errors. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court relied on compensation, risk-spreading, and deterrence ra-
tionales to hold Clintonville's accounting firm liable to third par-
ties.96 The court concluded that, without an imposition of liabil-
ity, the cost of credit to the general public would increase because
creditors would either have to absorb the cost of bad loans or hire
independent accountants to verify the information in audited re-
ports. 97 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that in specific
cases "public policy factors," such as the burden upon the defen-
dant of paying damages and the possibility of encouraging fraudu-
lent claims by providing for recovery, might call for a limitation of
liability to the broad class of foreseeable users.9"
The foreseeability approach was also followed in International
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.,99 a California
case subsequently overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. 10
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 756 (Cal. 1992).
94 Id.
95 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
96 Id. at 365.
97 Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, like the Rosenblum court, premised its con-
clusion on the availability of liability insurance to spread the risk. Id. But see supra
note 23 and accompanying text (discussing limited availability of insurance coverage).
98 Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 366-67.
99 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young Co.,
834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
100 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
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Butler issued an unqualified audit opinion on the 1978 financial
statements of its client, Westside Mortgage, Inc.'01 Relying upon
Westside's audited financial statements, International Mortgage
Co. ("IMC") entered into an agreement to purchase and resell
Westside's loans in the secondary mortgage market. 10 2 Westside
failed to deliver the promised trust deeds to IMC and defaulted on
its promissory note. 103 The principal asset on Westside's balance
sheet was a $100,000 note receivable secured by a deed of trust on
real property.10 4 The promissory note was actually worthless be-
cause of a prior foreclosure of a superior deed of trust that IMC
alleged Butler should have discovered in its audit.10 5 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal stated that the role of the independent auditor
had evolved since the time of the Ultramares decision. 106 The
court concluded that an accountant was negligent when he failed
to fulfill a duty of care to those third parties who may reasonably
and foreseeably have relied on the audited financial statement
prepared by that accountant. 10 7
The Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the foreseeability
rule in Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. '0
Touche Ross, however, has little precedential value for two rea-
sons. First, the court's statement of the rule is dictum; it held that
there was no liability on the part of the auditor because the loss
suffered by the third party resulted from criminal conduct occur-
ring after the audit.10 9 Second, the reasoning for adopting the
foreseeability rule was based on a unique Mississippi statute that
does not require privity to maintain a negligence action, including
one alleging economic loss." 0
101 Butler, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 219-20.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 223.
106 Butler, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The court stated that "the protectionist rule of
privity announced in Ultramares is no longer viable... [because at that time] the
primary obligation of the auditor was to the client who hired him or her... [whereas]
today [the accountant] occupies a position of public trust." Id.
107 Id. at 227; see also Biankanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) (applying simi-
lar foreseeability requirement). But see Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Ex-
panding Accountants'Liability, 1988 COLUMt. Bus. L. REV 213, 221 (1988) (noting de-
fendant in Biankanja knew plaintiff would be relying; hence, case is consistent with
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 and Ultramares).
108 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
109 Id. at 323-25.
110 Id. at 321; see Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1986).
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With the exception of the above cases, the foreseeability ap-
proach has not attracted a substantial following in the twelve
years since it was formally proposed. Indeed, commentators have
criticized the approach because of the indeterminate liability that
it imposes on CPAs.111 They have also rejected the arguments
that the adoption of this approach will lead to improved audit
quality, and that increases in cost from higher insurance premi-
ums or more thorough audits will be borne by the entities for
whom the audits are conducted. 1 2 Several states continue to fol-
low the privity standard."13 Others have generally rejected the
foreseeability basis in favor of the Restatement's intended benefici-
ary approach discussed below." 4
111 See generally Thomas E. Bilek, Accountants' Liability to the Third Party and
Public Policy: A Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689 (1985); Werner F. Ebke, In
Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the In-
dependent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 663 (1984); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Liability of Accountants for Negligence: How Can We Tell the Best Rule?, in
BUSINESS LAw: PRmNcipLEs, CAsEs, AND PoLIcY 1227 (Mark E. Roszkowski ed. 1989);
R. James Gormley, The Foreseen, the Foreseeable, and Beyond-Accountants'Liabil-
ity to Nonclients, 14 SETON HAiL L. REV. 528 (1984); Gossman, supra note 107;
Siliciano, supra note 16.
112 See Siliciano, supra note 16, at 1967.
113 See, e.g., Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Toro Co. v.
Krouse, Kern & Co., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ind. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 155 (7th
Cir. 1987); Pennine Resources, Inc. v. Dorwart Andrew & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D.
Pa. 1986); see also Dan L. Goldwasser, Accountants' Liability in 1988, in AccoUNT-
ANTS' LIABILITY 1988, at 11 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, No.
611, 1988).
Four states (Illinois, Utah, Arkansas and Kansas) have enacted statutes follow-
ing the privity standard. In the Kansas statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402 (Supp.
1987), a third party can recover if the auditor is aware of the third party's reliance,
the party has been identified in writing to the auditor and the specific transaction has
been described. The Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 450/30.1 (Smith-
Hurd 1994), the Utah Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (1990), and the Arkansas
statute, ARYa CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie 1987), all provide that the auditor can
limit its negligence liability to those third parties the auditor identifies in writing to
the client. See also Paul J. Herskovitz, Auditors and Third Party Negligence Suits:
Judicial Approaches and Legislative Reforms, Omo C.PYJA J., Winter 1990, at 21.
114 See, e.g., First Natl Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053,
1057-63 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Louisiana law and rejecting argument that all po-
tential lenders of audited company constitute "limited group" under section 552); Sel-
den v. Burnett, 754 P.2d 256, 259 (Alaska 1988) (holding that accountant owes duty of
due care to third party only if accountant specifically intends third party to invest
relying on his advice and only if accountant makes intent known); First Fla. Bank,
NA. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 12-15 (Fla. 1990) (rejecting foreseeable ap-
proach in favor of Restatement rule); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 199-
200 (Ga. 1987) (requiring actual notice that financial statements would be shown to
third party for liability); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 407
S.E.2d 178, 182-83 (N.C. 1991); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822
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C. Restatement (Second) of Torts
According to section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
an accountant breaches his professional obligations if, in perform-
ing his services, he makes negligent misrepresentations.1 15 When
a defendant makes false statements he honestly believes are true,
but without reasonable grounds for such belief, he may be liable
for negligent misrepresentation, a form of deceit.116 Moreover,
when a party holds itself out as possessing superior knowledge,
information, or expertise regarding the subject matter, and a
plaintiff is so situated that the plaintiff may reasonably rely on
such supposed knowledge, information, or expertise, the defend-
ant's misrepresentation may be treated as one of fact.117
One who negligently "supplies false information for the guid-
ance of others in their business transactions" is liable for the eco-
nomic loss suffered by the recipients in justifiable reliance on that
information." 8 The liability is limited to those for whose benefit
and guidance the information is intended or to whom the supplier
of the information knows the information will be provided."x9 The
scope of liability of a negligent supplier of information is appropri-
ately more narrowly restricted than that of an intentionally fraud-
ulent supplier.120 There is no liability to those to whom the audi-
tor had no reason to believe the information would be made
available, or when the client's transaction, as represented to the
auditor, changes so as to increase materially the audit risk.' 2 1
The first case in which a party without privity successfully
maintained a negligence action against an accountant was Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin.12 2 In Rusch Factors, Inc., a Rhode Island
S.W.2d 592, 595-96 (Tenn. 1991) (adopting modified Restatement test); Blue Bell, Inc.
v. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 411-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (Re-
statement portion followed); Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744
P.2d 1032, 1067-68 (Wash. 1987) (adopting Restatement rule in deference to legiti-
mate fears of indeterminate liability to third persons); First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v.
Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 311-12 (W. Va. 1989) (rejecting foreseeability and privity
rules in favor of Restatement rule); see also Herskovitz, supra note 113, at 25.
115 RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
116 5 WrriN, SuAiARY OF CALIFORmA LAw OF TORTS § 720, at 819 (9th ed. 1988).
117 Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1954).
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 552(1) (1977).
119 Id. § 552(2)(a).
120 Id. § 552(2) cmt. h.
121 Id. § 552(2) cmts. i, j.
122 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); see also Willis W. Hagen H, Accountants' Com-
mon Law Negligence Liability to Third Parties, 1988 COLUm. Bus. L. REV 181, 184
(1988) (discussing Rush Factors, Inc. as alternative to Ultramares doctrine).
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corporation provided audited financial statements that the plain-
tiff relied on in granting the corporation a $337,000 loan. 123 The
corporation was actually insolvent and subsequently went into re-
ceivership. 124 Rusch Factors successfully brought a lawsuit
against Levin, the auditor.1 25 The Rusch Factors court stated that
any class of plaintiffs must be actually foreseen (not just foresee-
able) and limited.126 The court reasoned that, in cases in which
the accounting work was intended to influence a limited number
of foreseen third parties, liability to those third parties arises.127
In the Iowa case of Ryan v. Kanne, 28 an accountant negli-
gently prepared the unaudited financial statements of a lumber
business. 129 Consistent with the Restatement, and notwithstand-
ing the absence of privity, the court ruled that the accountant was
liable for a negligent financial misrepresentation relied upon by
known prospective users of the financial statements. 13 0 In Shat-
terproof Glass Corp. v. James,'3 ' a Texas court ruled that the ac-
countants who had been authorized by their client to furnish fi-
nancial statements directly to the client's creditor were under a
duty of care to the reliant third party.132
In the Missouri case of Aluma Kraft Manufacturing Co. v. El-
mer Fox & Co. ,'3 the auditors knew that the book value of Aluma
Kraft stock, as determined from its audited financial statements,
was to be the purchase price of the company by Solmia, Inc.' 3 '
Assuming that the negligence of the auditors resulted in an in-
flated book value, the court concluded that an accountant is liable
to known third parties for negligence. '3 The court outlined sev-
eral factors that should be used to determine an accountant's lia-
bility for negligence: (1) the degree to which the transaction was
intended to influence the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of the in-
jury to the plaintiff; (3) the possibility that the plaintiff would suf-
123 Rush Factors Inc., 284 F. Supp. at 86-87.
124 Id. at 86.
125 Id. at 92-93.
126 Id. at 91-93.
127 Id. at 92-93.
128 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
129 Id. at 397-99.
130 Id. at 402-03.
131 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
132 Id. at 876-77.
133 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
134 Id. at 383-85.
135 Id.
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fer damages; and (4) the proximity between the defendant's con-
duct and the plaintiff's injury.13 6 Several other cases have
endorsed the Restatement approach in this and related
contexts.
1 37
HI. Bzzy v. ARTHuR YOUNG & Co.: A NECESSARY DELINEATION
OF AccouNTAVrs' LEGAL LiABmrry
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.138 provides an analysis of account-
ants' legal liability to third parties that rejects the potentially un-
limited liability of the foreseeability standard and the narrow
scope of the privity doctrine. The court utilizes section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to support the position that the lia-
bility of accountants for general negligence in the conduct of an
audit of its client's financial statements is confined to the client;
third parties may recover under certain conditions only when an
accountant makes negligent misrepresentations.13 9
Bily arose from the failure of Osborne Computer Corporation.
In early 1983, some of the plaintiffs, who included individual in-
vestors and pension and venture capital investment funds, pro-
vided direct loans or letters of credit to secure bank loans to Os-
borne Computer.140 These loans were intended as "bridge loans"
to provide operating funds until the time of an initial public offer-
ing ("IPO") that Osborne planned for 1983.141 In exchange for
their assistance in obtaining the loans, several plaintiffs received
warrants that entitled their holders to purchase blocks of the com-
pany's stock at prices that were expected to yield sizable profits if
a public offering took place.' 42 During this same period, other
plaintiffs purchased Osborne Computer common stock in private
placements. 143 In early 1983, for example, Robert Bily, who was
also a director of the company, purchased 37,500 shares of stock
for $1.5 million from Adam Osborne, the company founder.144
136 Id. at 382.
137 See supra note 114 (listing cases that adopted Restatement approach in find-
ing or rejecting accountants liability).
138 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
139 Id. at 757-59.
140 Id. at 747.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
144 Id.
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Arthur Young & Co. issued unqualified opinions on the pri-
vately held corporation's 1981 and 1982 financial statements.
145
The partner-in-charge personally delivered 100 copies of the 1982
audited statements to the company. 146 The company's sales began
to falter in 1983, and Osborne filed for bankruptcy on September
13, 1983.147 The plaintiffs' investments in Osborne were not re-
covered. Except for one plaintiff, who did not receive or read the
1982 audit report, the plaintiffs claimed that in making their in-
vestments they relied on the unqualified 1982 audit report that
they received from Osborne Computer.
1 48
At trial, an expert witness testified to more than forty defi-
ciencies in the audits, including a $3 million understatement of
liabilities, a failure to detect weaknesses in internal control proce-
dures, and a failure to disclose discovered deviations. 149 The ex-
pert concluded there was gross professional negligence on the part
of Arthur Young.1 50 The jury returned a verdict against the audi-
tor for professional negligence, with no comparative negligence on
the part of the plaintiffs 1Y' On appeal, the decision was affirmed
by the California Court of Appeal and then reversed and re-
manded by the California Supreme Court.
1 52
In Bily the California Supreme Court declined to permit all
merely foreseeable third-party users of audit reports to sue the
auditor on a theory of professional negligence.1 5 3 This holding
was based on three central concerns: (1) given the secondary
"watchdog" role of the auditor, the complexity of professional audit
opinions, and the potentially tenuous relationship between audit
reports and economic losses from investing and lending decisions,
the auditor faces liability to all foreseeable third parties far out of
proportion to its degree of fault; (2) the sophisticated class of
plaintiffs in auditor liability cases (lenders and investors) permits
the use of contract rather than tort liability to control and adjust
risks; and (3) the asserted benefits of more accurate auditing and
more efficient loss spreading using the foreseeability approach are
145 Id.
146 Id. at 748.
147 Id.
148 Bily, 834 P.2d at 748.
149 Id.
150 Id.
161 Id. at 749.
152 Id.
153 Bily, 834 P.2d at 761.
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unlikely to occur; instead, increased expense and decreased avail-
ability of audit services are the probable consequences of ex-
panded liability.154 The court stated that, as a matter of economic
and social policy, "third parties should be encouraged to rely on
their own prudence" rather than being permitted to recover from
the auditor for mistakes in the client's financial statements.155 To
do otherwise compels the auditor to become, "in effect, an insurer
of not only the financial statements, but of bad loans and invest-
ments in general."' 56
Bily departs from International Mortgage Co. v. John P. But-
ler Accountancy Corp. by restricting the class of plaintiffs to whom
the accountant may be held liable for general negligence."5 7 As
discussed previously, the decision of the California Court of Ap-
peal in Butler reflects the view that negligence recovery should be
permitted to ali foreseeable users of audit reports. 158 Writing for
the Bily majority, Judge Lucas disagreed with this view,' 59 hold-
ing that the rejection of the Ultramares requirement that third
parties must have the equivalent of privity is without support or
analysis.' 60 According to Judge Lucas, a foreseeability rule ap-
plied to accountants' reports would produce large numbers of ex-
pensive and complex lawsuits of "questionable merit as scores of
investors and lenders seek to recoup business losses."' 6 '
In addition to rejecting the foreseeability standard, the court
acknowledged several limitations on the auditor's ability to dis-
cover errors or irregularities in the client's financial state-
ments.'6 2 The client engages the auditor, pays the audit fee, com-
municates with the auditor throughout the audit, and controls the
data to which the auditor has access.' 6 3 There are no absolute
standards to verify the accuracy of the financial statements; audi-
tors must interpret and apply hundreds of professional standards
in a complex judgment process.' 64 Further, the client controls dis-
154 Id.
155 Id. at 765.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 766 (overruling International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Ac-
cantancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
158 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
159 Bily, 834 P.2d at 766-67 n.15.
160 Id. at 766-67.
161 Id. at 767.
162 Id. at 762.
163 Id.
164 Bily, 834 P.2d at 763.
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semination of the reports, creating a huge body of potential claim-
ants. 165 The nature of the economic loss, should it occur, creates
an uncertain and disproportionate liability for the auditor, who
cannot control the management of the audited company, but is
often the only solvent defendant.16 6
In determining auditors' legal liabilities, Bily argued for a dis-
tinction between the tort of negligent misrepresentation and the
separate tort of negligence. Judge Lucas contended that negligent
misrepresentation is a species of the tort of deceit,167 and the per-
son or class of persons entitled to rely upon the misrepresenta-
tions is restricted to those to whom or for whom the misrepresen-
tations were made.'6 8 Although not in privity, those specifically
intended and known beneficiaries of the accountant's or auditor's
services are a class to whom the professional may incur liabil-
ity. 69 Recovery on the grounds of negligent misrepresentation re-
quires that the plaintiff prove "justifiable reliance" on a materially
false statement made by the defendant.' Thus, negligent mis-
representation requires proving that misrepresentations were
made by the defendant with the intent to influence the plaintiff,
and that actual and justifiable reliance on those misrepresenta-
tions is responsible for the plaintiff's loss. In contrast, the charge
of general negligence directs the jury's attention to the defend-
ant's level of care and compliance with professional standards in
performing his or her duties.1 7 ' The tort of general or professional
negligence imposes a duty to exercise due care toward contracting
parties and intended third-party beneficiaries. 172 When an audit
engagement contract expressly identifies a particular third party
165 Id. at 762.
166 Id. at 763.
167 Id. at 768.
168 Id. at 768 (citing WrrIIN, supra note 116 § 721, at 820); see RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 cmts. g, h (1977); see also Christiansen v. Roddy, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (listing elements of cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation).
169 Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
170 Christiansen, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
171 Bily, 834 P.2d at 772.
172 Id. at 770 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977)); see
also Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 748 (Cal. 1976) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (em-
ploying similar multi-factor analysis to determine liability to third parties); Roberts v.
Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(discussing attorney's duties to clients and third parties).
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or parties, those parties may under appropriate circumstances
possess the rights of parties to the contract.1
7 3
Judge Lucas argued that confining liability for general negli-
gence to those whom the accountant's engagement is intended to
benefit is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'74
According to the Restatement, liability for merely negligent behav-
ior is appropriately restricted to those cases in which the supplier
of information "manifests an intent to supply the information for
the sort of use in which the plaintiff's loss occurs."' 75 Judge Lucas
further argued that section 552(b) of Restatement (Second) of Torts
recognizes commercial realities by avoiding both unlimited liabil-
ity for economic losses in cases of professional mistake and exon-
eration of the auditor in situations in which the auditor clearly
intended to influence third parties.'
7 6
By permitting recovery for negligent misrepresentation, Bily
provided reasonable protection for those to whom accountants
supply information. It also established a basis for restricting ac-
countants' legal liability for negligence to those with whom or for
whom the accountant has contracted to provide services. By re-
ceiving notice of the third parties to whom potential liability may
be incurred, the auditor can decide whether to accept the engage-
ment, adjust the audit plan to meet the needs of third parties, and
negotiate audit fees that are commensurate with the scope of lia-
bility. If, on the other hand, the supplier of the information
"merely knows of the ever-present possibility of repetition to any-
one, and the possibility of action in reliance upon [the informa-
tion] on the part of anyone to whom it may be repeated," the sup-
plier bears no legal responsibility.1
7 7
IV. IMPROVING AuDIT PRACTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGING THE
INERENT LIMITATIONS OF AUDITs
The Bily decision established reasonable parameters for ac-
countants' liabilities to third parties. It also recognized the limita-
tions to the assurances that auditors' opinions on the financial
statements of their clients provide. The accounting profession
should endeavor to meet its obligations to third parties through
"73 Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
174 Id. at 769.
175 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 552, cmt. a (1977).
176 Bily, 834 P.2d at 769.
177 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 552, cmt. h (1977).
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improved self-regulation. In March 1993, the POE issued a report
that proposes changes in audit practice and additional disclosures
in accountants' reports.178 Although the POB was criticized for its
support of the profession's drive to limit liability through the pas-
sage of federal and state laws and for its conclusion that higher
auditing fees are needed,17 9 the POB deserves credit for advocat-
ing that accountants should accept greater responsibility for the
detection of management fraud. The following is a discussion of
the POB recommendations that have the greatest potential for im-
proving the audit practice and clarifying the limitations of audited
financial statements.
A. Audit Practice
The report includes recommendations for action by several
parties that influence the practice of auditing. The POB recog-
nizes that the current self-regulatory system is unable to impose
appropriate sanctions against firms that do not belong to the SEC
Practice Section, but nevertheless audit SEC clients. 18 0 To ad-
dress this, the POB recommends that the SEC amend its rules to
require SEC registrants to disclose whether their auditors have
had a peer review, the date of the most recent review, and its re-
sults.:"' This information would enable those who obtain audited
financial statements filed with the SEC to receive explicit infor-
mation about the compliance or noncompliance of the SEC regis-
trant's auditor with peer review requirements.
The POB report also includes recommendations to make the
Quality Control Inquiry Committee ("QCIC") more effective in ad-
dressing audit failures..8 2 Presently, when civil suits or criminal
indictments are filed against an SEC Practice firm or its person-
nel, or when the firm is investigated by a regulatory agency, the
firm is required to notify the QCIC, which conducts an investiga-
tion to determine whether corrective measures should be taken. 183
178 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11.
179 Alison L. Cowan, A (Very) Modest Auditing Approach, N.Y. TimES, Mar. 5,
1993, at D3.
180 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 17; see also Daniel Pearl, How 2 Flor-
ida Firms Fooled Stockholders, Auditors, and the SEC, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1992, at
Al (discussing audits of Cascade International Inc. and College Bound Inc.).
181 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 18 (Recommendation H-1).
182 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 18-26; supra note 11.
183 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 18-21. The determination of whether
an audit failure has occurred and the imposition of sanctions is the responsibility of
the courts, the SEC, and other regulatory and government bodies. The QCIC does not
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To enable the profession to learn from its mistakes and improve
its performance, the POB proposes that firms be required to report
to the QCIC the audit guidance that the firms believe might have
avoided the allegations made against them.'8 4 This would include
reporting business, accounting, and auditing practices that pose
new or special problems for auditors. The QCIC would then an-
alyze this information, along with that gathered by peer-review
teams, as a basis for developing audit guidelines for accounting
professionals.' 5
The POB's strongest call for change is in the area of account-
ants' responsibilities for detecting fraud.'8 6 The report states:
[Ulsers of audited financial statements must obtain some mea-
sure of additional assurance that the company's affairs are being
conducted in accordance with specified laws (to the extent audi-
tors have the ability to make such judgments); that the com-
pany's internal controls meet the criteria recently adopted by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the National Commis-
sion on Fraudulent Financial Reporting; and that management
is not manipulating its financial reports or committing other
frauds. 18 7
The POB contends that auditors are not consistently complying
with the auditing standard that requires them to assess the risk
that management fraud may cause the financial statements to be
materially misstated.18 8 To assist auditors in identifying symp-
toms that indicate an increase in the likelihood of management
fraud, the POB recommends that the profession develop compre-
have the power to punish anyone for misconduct. If a member firm does not cooperate
with the QCIC, however, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section may
impose sanctions.
184 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 27-30 (Recommendation rn-i).
185 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 30 (Recommendation M-2 and 3).
186 See PuBuc INTEREST, supra note 11, at 33 n.22. Prior to the twentieth cen-
tury, the detection of fraud was perceived by auditors and their clients as the princi-
pal purpose of an audit. See also GARY. J. PREvITs & BARBARA D. MERIno,.A HISTORY
OF AccoutrrnI IN AMERICA 129-30 (1979).
187 PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 33; COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE TREADwAY COMUSSION, INTERNAL CONTROL - INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
(1992). For a discussion of the efforts of the SEC and responses of management and
accounting professionals to proposals to require reporting on the effectiveness of in-
ternal controls, see infra note 193.
188 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 42; see also AU § 316 (requiring audi-
tors assess risk that management fraud may cause financial statements to be materi-
ally misstated); AU § 317, at 87 (discussing nature and extent of auditor's considera-
tion, in audit of client's financial statements, of possibility of illegal acts by client and
responsibilities of auditor when possibly illegal act is detected).
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hensive audit guidelines and specify additional audit procedures
to be implemented when fraud is suspected.'8 9 These measures,
in addition to the previously discussed recommendation that the
QCIC analyze the factors contributing to audit failures, should en-
able accountants to improve their ability to detect fraud.
Congress should enact legislation to expand the obligation of
auditors to report illegal acts.190 If the client management or
board of directors fails to take the necessary action on suspected
illegalities discovered by the auditor, the auditor should be re-
quired to report the suspected acts to the appropriate authorities,
including the SEC.' 91 The POB also suggests that the profession
consult with Congress to assure that any legislation enacted
makes explicit the limitations of auditors in identifying illegal
acts.
19 2
The SEC's proposal that management include, in its annual
report to investors and in the report filed on Form 10-K, an as-
sessment of the effectiveness of the company's system of internal
controls should be supported by the accounting profession. 193 The
189 See PuBLIc INTEREST, supra note 11, at 43 (Recommendation V-1 and 2).
190 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 55 (Recommendation V-14).
191 See AICPA Supports Fraud Detection Bill, J. AcCT., May 1993, at 15. The
AICPA endorses an amended version of H.R. 574, the Financial Fraud Detection and
Disclosure Act, which includes language that "principal responsibility for setting ac-
counting standards remains in the private sector," subject to oversight by the SEC.
Id.; see PuBic INTEREST, supra note 11, at 55. Congressmen Dingell, Wyden, and
Markey sponsored the Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act, which would
require auditors to report suspected illegal acts to the SEC if the company fails to
respond to the auditor's findings. Id. But see AU § 317.23. Existing audit standards
do not require the disclosure of illegal acts to parties other than the client's senior
management and its audit committee or board of directors except under specific cir-
cumstances. These circumstances are (a) when the entity reports an auditor change
as required by securities law on Form 8-K, (b) to a successor auditor, when the succes-
sor auditor makes inquiries in accordance with AU § 315, which requires the specific
permission of the client, (c) in response to a subpoena, and (d) to a funding agency or
other specified agency in accordance with requirements for the audit of entities that
receive financial assistance from government agencies. Id.
192 PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 55 (Recommendation V-14); see also supra
note 38 (quoting AU § 316.07 which notes specific limitations of audits for detecting
fraud).
193 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 53-54 (Recommendation V-12); see also
COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, INTERNAL
CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, 89-94 (1992); MARc J. EPSTEIN & ALBERT D.
SPALDING, JR., THE AccouNTANT's GUiDE TO LEGAL LIABILITY AND ETmcs 134-137
(1993). At various times since the SEC's 1979 proposal entitled, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-15772, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,702 (May 4, 1979), the SEC has attempted to
impose mandatory internal control reporting requirements on all publicly held U.S.
corporations. CoMMrrrEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY Commis-
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guidelines developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organiza-
tions ("COSO") provide management with a basis for assessing the
effectiveness of, and improving internal controls over, financial re-
porting.194 With the recent issuance of attestation standards for
evaluating management's assertions about the adequacy of inter-
nal controls over financial reporting,' 95 auditors should be re-
quired to express an opinion on management's evaluation of the
company's internal controls.' 96  Evaluating internal controls
should, when problems are found, lead to improvements in those
controls. If top management demands conformity with the inter-
nal controls, fraudulent activity will become more difficult to com-
SION, supra, at 90 n.2. Although the current SEC proposal does not include a require-
ment that auditors assess management's report on internal control, versions intro-
duced in 1979, 1988, and 1989 included such requirements. EPSTEIN & SPALDING,
supra, at 135. The SEC proposals, none of which were enacted, are based on the belief
that the reliability and credibility of financial statements and other management dis-
closures depends on the effectiveness of the entity's internal control system. Id. In
prior years, SEC registrants and accountants objected to the enactment of these pro-
posals on the ground that it was not feasible to evaluate the effectiveness of internal
controls as envisioned in the proposals. CoMUrrrEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE TREADWAY COmnssIoN, supra, at 91.
In 1985 several groups, including the AICPA, the American Accounting Associa-
tion ("AAA"), the Financial Executives Institute ("FEr), the Institute of Internal Au-
ditors ("HA"), and the National Association of Accountants ("NAA") (now the Institute
of Management Accountants ("IA"W)) formed the National Commission on Fraudu-
lent Reporting ("Treadway Commission") in response to SEC and other agency pro-
posals that management evaluate internal controls. EPSTEIN & SPALDING, supra, at
136. The commission issued a 1987 report entitled the Report of the National Com-
mission on Fraudulent Reporting that included recommendations for corporate man-
agers, boards of directors, CPAs, the SEC, and other regulatory agencies of specific
policies and procedures that should be adopted to improve internal controls and re-
duce fraudulent reporting. Id.
The 1987 report also called upon COSO, a subcommittee of the Treadway Com-
mission, to review internal control literature and develop a set of internal control
concepts and definitions that could be used by public companies in analyzing and im-
proving their systems. COW'tTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATION OF THE TREADwAY
COWHISSION, supra, at 93. The 1992 publication of INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED
FRAmEwoRK represents the efforts of the COSO to provide practical, widely accepted
guidance for developing effective internal controls. Id.
194 COMIrTTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADwAY Co IumssIoN,
supra note 193.
195 See Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements No. 2 Issued, CPA
LETTER, July-August 1993, at 4. Attestation Standard No. 2, Reporting on an Entity's
Internal Control Structure Over Financial Reporting (superseding SAS No. 30, Re-
porting on Internal Accounting Control), provides auditors guidance in reporting on
the fairness of management's assertion on the adequacy of internal controls, and is
effective for examinations of managemenes assertion when the assertion is as of De-
cember 15, 1993, or thereafter.
196 PuBLic INTEREST, supra note 11, at 54 (Recommendation V-12).
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mit. An effective system of internal controls, however, cannot
guarantee the honesty of management or of company employees
who may collude to defraud the company, and a statement to this
effect should be included in the auditor's report.197
Other suggestions for improving audit practice are intended
to assure professional independence. These proposals include
more extensive use of concurring partner reviews in order to pro-
vide assurances that the audits have been conducted properly,
and that the accounting treatments are consistent with GAAP.' 98
When participating in the standard setting-process, and in dis-
cussing reporting practices with the SEC, accountants should
avoid the appearance of client advocacy. 199 When conflicts arise,
accountants should place reporting the economic substance of fi-
nancial transactions ahead of lending support to clients' reporting
preferences.2 0
B. Inherent Limitations
The expectation gap refers to differences between the assur-
ances that the public or knowledgeable segments of it believe an
audit should provide, and the assurances that an audit actually
does provide. 20 1 Even if auditing standards and practice are im-
197 PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 54. To clarify the limitations of internal
controls and the auditor's attestation on their effectiveness, Recommendation V-13
states that the Auditing Standards Board should establish standards that require
clear communication of the limits of the assurances being provided to third parties
when auditors report on the adequacy of client internal control systems. Id. at 54
(Recommendation V-13).
198 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 49. Recommendation V-8 states:
The concurring partner, whose participation in an audit is a membership
requirement of the SEC Practice Section, should be responsible for assuring
that those consulted on accounting matters are aware of all of the relevant
facts and circumstances, including an understanding of the financial state-
ments in the context of which the accounting policy is being considered. The
concurring and consulting partners should know enough about the client to
ensure that all of the relevant facts and circumstances are marshalled.
[They should] also possess the increased detachment that comes from not
having to face the client on an ongoing basis. The concurring partner should
have the responsibility to conclude whether the accounting treatment ap-
plied is consistent with the objectives of Recommendations V-6 [that the eco-
nomic substance of the financial transaction is reported.]
Id.
199 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 43-45 (Recommendations V-3).
200 See PUBLIC INTEREsT, supra note 11, at 48-49 (Recommendations V-6, 7, and
8).
201 Two investigations conducted by Congress in the late 1970s and one in 1985
dealt with the public responsibilities of CPAs and questioned whether self-regulation
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proved, as discussed above, there are inherent limitations to the
degree of assurance that can be provided by audited financial
statements. Financial statements contain estimates of amounts
that depend on future uncertain events. Their relevancy may de-
cline rapidly when conditions within the reporting entity or the
external environment change; the statements are only one of the
sources of information that should be consulted before making an
investment or extending credit to a company 20 2
The POB recommends that the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board ("FASB") 2 0 3 add to its agenda a project to design a
brief statement explaining the limitations of financial statements.
The explanation should be included in every set of financial state-
ments described as being "in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles."20 4 The FASB should also resolve the ques-
tion of whether the reporting of values and changes in values
should be included in audited financial statements rather than, or
in addition to, historic transaction prices.20 5 The POB supports
the FASB's efforts to include disclosures in the financial state-
ments about the nature of the risks and uncertainties associated
was promoting the public's interests, giving rise to the term expectation gap. See Ac-
counting and Auditing Practices and Procedures: Hearings on S. 402-1 Before the Sub-
comm. on Reports, Accounting, and Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmen-
tal Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Reform and Self-Regulation Efforts of the
Accounting Profession: Hearings on S. 402-20 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978); SEC and Corporate Audits: Hearings on M.R. 361-86 Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
202 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 34-35.
203 The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") is an independent stan-
dard setting organization established by the AICPA in the early 1970s.
204 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 36 (Recommendation IV-i).
205 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 38 (Recommendation IV-2). For the
most part, the financial statement amounts are recorded at historic cost and not ad-
justed for changes in market value. REcoGNrrION AND MEASUREMENT IN FINANCLr
STATEMENTS OF BusnEss ENTERPRIsE, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts
No. 5, 67-69 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1992/93). Whether financial statement
amounts should be recorded at historic cost or current value has been debated by a
number of individuals and organizations concerned with financial reporting. PUBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 11, at 37. The POB believes this issue should be resolved, but
takes no official position on the correct reporting basis. Among those that the POB
believes the FASB should consult to resolve the issue are the AICPA, the Financial
Executives Institute, and the Association for Investment Management and Research.
Id. It is the position of the POB that failure to resolve issues such as this decreases
the confidence of the public in the usefulness of accounting information. Id.
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with the reporting entity's operations and financial condition.20 6
Finally, the POB calls for explicit disclosure of the prospective na-
ture of certain accounting estimates and a caveat that estimated
results may not be achieved.2 °7
An audit in accordance with GAAS requires numerous subjec-
tive judgments by the auditor. It involves the comparison of sam-
ples of the asserted facts in the financial statements with eviden-
tiary matter, a search for material errors or irregularities, and an
informed opinion on whether the financial reports are, in all mate-
rial respects, in compliance with GAAP.20 8 Rather than repre-
senting a defensive retrenchment, the disclosures that the POB
recommends are intended to clarify the subjective nature of much
financial information. The auditor's role in attesting to whether
the financial statements prepared by the client fairly present, in
all material respects, the results of operations and the financial
position of the firm, is to provide an independent, expert opinion
based on evidence collected according to GAAS. An audit does not
and cannot guarantee that management is honest, that errors or
fraudulent reporting will always be detected, or that the com-
pany's past performance will continue into the future.
CONCLUSION
The common-law basis of accountants' liability for negligence
to third parties is traced through cases that extend from the 1842
decision of Winterbottom v. Wright20 9 to the 1992 case of Bily v.
Arthur Young & Co.2 10 The concerns expressed by Judge Cardozo
in Ultramares211 are as relevant today as they were when he for-
mulated his precedent-setting decision in 1931. He questioned the
206 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 38-39 (Recommendation IV-3). The
AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Committee issued a proposed Statement of
Position, Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties and Financial
Flexibility, (AICPA, File 4290), which was approved by the FASB for public exposure
in November 1992, (AICPA, File 4290). Responses during the exposure period, which
is four months, will be considered in developing the final SOP.
207 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 39 (Recommendation PV-4).
208 See PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11, at 35.
209 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
210 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). Furthermore, the California Court of Appeal ruled
in Industrial Indem. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 33, 37 (Cal. App.
1993), that the decision in Bily relating to accountant's liability to third parties ap-
plies retroactively to pending cases and reversed the order granting a new trial to
Industrial Indemnity, which had previously been awarded damages of $1.
211 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
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wisdom of holding accountants liable for negligence to third par-
ties who claimed to have relied on audited financial statements
that were the product of a contract between the entity to whom
the third parties had extended funds and an independent CPA
firm. Judge Cardozo reasoned that holding accountants liable for
general negligence to third parties would require accountants to
assume a degree of responsibility that was out of proportion to the
services for which they contracted when performing a financial
statement audit. Ultramares established the rule that account-
ants owe a general duty of care to contracting parties and to those
third parties who bear a relationship with the auditor that is the
equivalent of privity.
In Bily, the California Supreme Court analyzed relevant
cases from Ultramares to the present and section 552 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts to support its decision to deny recovery
to third parties for general negligence. Bily rejects the notion that
accountants owe a general duty of care to foreseeable third par-
ties. When the court considered the minor role of the auditor in
the success or failure of a business venture, it rejected liability for
general negligence to foreseeable parties because such liability is
out of proportion to the accountant's degree of fault. The imposi-
tion of the foreseeability rule, when applied to accountants' re-
ports, the distribution of which is beyond the accountants' control,
encourages third parties to use the legal system to recover their
investment losses rather than relying on their own prudence in
evaluating business prospects. Accountants should direct their ef-
forts toward influencing other jurisdictions to follow Bily and the
long-standing privity or the equivalent of privity standard
promulgated by the New York courts.
Developing improved procedures to meet its professional obli-
gations to third parties with privity and those recognized by Bily
is another goal to which attention should be directed. The POB's
In the Public Interest: Issues Confronting the Accounting Profes-
sion provides suggestions for improving auditing standards and
practices, particularly in the area of detecting management fraud,
and for improving disclosures in accountants' reports that would
acknowledge their inherent limitations. 1 2 By focusing its re-
sources on these two objectives, the profession can improve its
212 See PuBLIC INTEREST, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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ability to perform the independent auditor's function and to fulfill
its legal duties.
